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Abstract 
 
Township-village enterprises (TVEs) were a major engine of China’s rapid rural 
industrialization in the past three decades. TVEs also played a key role in fostering 
entrepreneurship and served as a major stepping-stone for institutional changes when 
legal protections of private property rights were not in place and the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were slow to react to changing market demand. As private ownership 
was gradually recognized legally, TVEs lost their edge in competing with private firms. 
In the past two decades, industrial clusters with a concentration of private entrepreneurial 
firms coordinated by local governments have emerged rapidly in many areas. The 
structures of such firms as TVEs and the subsequent clustering modes of production are 
an outcome of interaction with other local and macro environments. As the environment 
changes, a firm’s organization and organizational structure may change as well.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Township-village enterprises (TVEs), rural “collectively owned” entrepreneurial firms, 
had a great impact on the rise of China in the past three decades. A large body of 
literature has shown that TVEs were a major engine of China’s rapid rural 
industrialization. TVEs also played a key role in fostering entrepreneurship and served as 
a major stepping-stone for institutional changes when legal protections of private 
property rights were not in place and the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were slow to 
react to changing market demand (Weitzman and Xu 1994; Che and Qian 1998; 
Mukherjee and Zhang 2007).  
 
A basic feature of TVEs is the deep involvement of local governments, particularly 
township governments.1 At the same time, the institution of the TVE is heterogeneous. 
The course of TVE development did not follow a one-size-fits-all blueprint. Instead, 
various models of the TVE emerged and evolved in adaptation to local comparative 
advantage and constraints. Well-known models include the southern Jiangsu (Sunan) 
model, the Wenzhou model in Zhejiang province, and the Guangdong model. Despite 
differences in details, TVEs share the following key characteristics: all were led by 
entrepreneurs; all had vaguely defined ownership at the incipient stage, reflecting certain 
institutional constraints (Weitzman and Xu 1994; Li 1996); and all had an intimate 
relationship with local governments (Qian and Xu 1993; Chang and Wang 1994; Che and 
Qian 1998).  
 
As private ownership was gradually recognized legally, TVEs lost their edge in 
competing with private firms. After reaching its peak in the mid-1990s, the sector phased 
out quickly. Concurrent with the decline of TVEs was the rise of private entrepreneurship 
firms. In addition to the TVEs’ legacies of breeding entrepreneurship and spreading 
technology know-how, there is a common key factor that was responsible for the 
spectacular development of the TVEs and, later, of private firms—the local governments. 
In fact, many of the entrepreneurship firms’ origins can be traced to TVEs as many early 
private firms were spun off from TVEs.  
 
In the past two decades, industrial clusters with a concentration of private entrepreneurial 
firms coordinated by local governments have emerged rapidly in vast rural areas in 
coastal provinces. In the clusters, production processes, which are usually integrated 
within a single firm in developed countries, are segmented into many small “firms,” each 
of them narrowly specialized in one process. Designers, suppliers, manufacturers, and 
merchants have organized themselves into a dynamic and entrepreneurial network. 
                                                        
1 A township is the lowest administrative level of government. A township government was called a 
commune government before 1984. A typical township has a population between 30,000 and 150,000. 
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Instead of vertical integration, firms in industrial clusters experience a vertical division of 
labor. This feature of increasing the division of labor fundamentally alters ownership, 
operation, coordination, finance, and production. For example, with the division of labor, 
capital barriers to entry have been lowered, enabling more farmers with entrepreneurial 
talents to participate in the production process. Although a deepening division of labor 
might incur a higher coordination cost among different parties involved in the 
transactions, the benefits of industrial clusters might make this entrepreneurial network 
more efficient than alternative arrangements.  
 
Unlike the TVEs, the small “firms” are privately owned. Similar to the TVE arrangement, 
local governments, particularly the township governments, have played a central role in 
facilitating development. A very interesting point here is that many of the functions of 
local government were transformed after the fall of the TVEs from direct control and 
management of TVEs to coordination and provision of public goods essential for 
clustered private firms. We will discuss the trade-offs posed by these institutional 
arrangements.  
 
The following section discusses the origin and rise of TVEs. Section 3 presents the fall of 
TVEs and the rise of private firms. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. The Origin and Rise of TVEs 
 
2.1 Origin of TVEs 
 
Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government 
transplanted the Soviet model of central planning at full scale in the first five-year plan 
(1952–1957). Not long after that transplantation of the Soviet model, because of conflicts 
between the Soviet model and the existing Chinese governance structure, there occurred 
several major political/economic campaigns that led at great cost to two vast waves of 
decentralization: the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in 
the late 1960s. The development of the rural industrial sector before the reforms that 
began in the late 1970s is partly a consequence of the decentralization waves, which 
empowered and enabled local governments (Xu 2008), and is partly rooted in 
entrepreneurial traditions, especially in the coastal areas, that can be traced back through 
several hundred years of history in the textile industry, the pottery industry, the tea 
processing industry, and so on.  
 
In the first wave of regional decentralization, people’s communes were established in all 
the rural areas in China. The people’s communes played a dual role in the rural areas: 
they were both the lowest government apparatus and the highest level of the rural 
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collective system. The commune itself was organized hierarchically—the immediate 
subordinate units of the commune were brigades, and at the bottom level of the collective 
hierarchy were production teams. In addition to Mao’s policy of encouraging rural 
industries, the budgets of communes and brigades mainly came from the commune and 
brigade enterprises (CBEs). All of this gave the communes and brigades strong incentives 
to set up CBEs. 
 
As part of the People’s Commune Campaign and the Great Leap Forward Campaign, in 
the late 1950s the central government launched a campaign to “run industry by the 
masses.” During these campaigns, CBEs grew rapidly. In 1958, the total employment of 
CBEs was 18 million and the gross value of CBE products was 6 billion yuan (Table 1). 
However, during the mass movements, without markets and without rigorous 
bureaucratic rules, many CBE products were useless except as accounting figures. 
Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward Campaign, and facing extremely severe 
shortages of raw materials, the central government decided to shut down most CBEs. 
From 1960 to 1963, the number of CBEs dropped from 117,000 to 11,000 and the gross 
output value of CBE products fell from 1.98 billion yuan to 0.42 billion yuan. CBE 
growth began anew with the recovery of the economy. In the late 1960s, the CBEs had 
recovered to their late 1950s level (Xu 1995). 
 
The second wave of Chinese regional decentralization occurred in the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–1976). During that period, a huge amount of resources were 
decentralized and tens of thousands of small SOEs and collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs) were set up (Xu 2008). The growth of small local SOEs and urban COEs 
accumulated human capital and made it easier for the rural sector to boost industrial 
output both in the form of technology and in terms of producer goods. CBEs have grown 
quickly since the 1970s, particularly since the mid-1970s. In 1976, at the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, the CBEs numbered 1.1 million and the gross output of CBEs was 
27.2 billion yuan. 
 
2.2 Rise of TVEs and Major TVE Models  
 
The Chinese economic reform started with agriculture in the late 1970s. The essence of 
the reform was decollectivization of landownership. The most important part of the 
reform was officially called the household responsibility system (HRS). During the first 
period of HRS implementation between 1978 and 1984, output in the Chinese 
agricultural sector increased by more than 61%, and 78% of the increase in productivity 
in Chinese agriculture in that period was due to changes in HRS reform (McMillan et al. 
1989). Lin (1992) reported that the dominant source of growth in agriculture output 
during 1978–1984 was the change from the production-team system to HRS, which was 
directly responsible for 49% of the output growth. Moreover, 46% of the output growth 
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came from increases in inputs. As a result of the agriculture reform’s success, the 
commune system was officially abandoned in 1984. Consequently, all the commune 
governments were converted into township governments and all the CBEs were officially 
renamed township-village enterprises, or TVEs. The major function of a township 
government was transformed from agriculture into managing or setting up TVEs.  
 
Officially, TVEs are collectively owned enterprises located in townships (or villages). All 
the people in the township or village that “sets up” the TVE own the firm collectively. A 
township government is regarded as the “representative” of the people in the community, 
and thus it is the de facto executive owner of the TVEs in the community. Typically the 
control rights of TVEs are partly delegated to managers through a contract (officially 
called the management responsibility contract). It was common for employees of a TVE 
to collectively sign a contract with the executive “owner”—the township government 
(Weitzman and Xu 1994). 
 
By conventional wisdom, firms with vaguely defined property rights should perform 
poorly; however, TVE performance was spectacular. Between 1981 and 1990, the total 
industrial output of TVEs grew at an average annual rate of 28.1%, which doubled that of 
the national average and more than tripled that of the state sector. With the rapid growth 
of TVEs, the status of the TVE sector changed from a subsidiary subsector of agriculture 
to the second largest sector in the national economy. In the nonstate sector, about 80% of 
the output was produced by TVE and similar cooperatives. The TVE sector outcompeted 
the state sector in both growth rate and productivity. As a result of the TVE sector’s fast 
growth, the nonstate sector’s share of industrial output increased from 22% in 1978 to 
47% in 1991, while the state sector’s share declined from 78% to 53% in the same period 
(Qian and Xu 1993). Furthermore, the growth rate of total factor productivity of TVEs 
was about 10 times that of state enterprises (Weitzman and Xu 1994). TVE development 
peaked in the mid-1990s, as shown in Table 2. Employment in the TVE sector reached 61 
million in 1995. TVEs’ share of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 14.3% in 
1980 to 37.5% in 1995 (Table 3). It is no exaggeration that the TVE was the major engine 
of China’s growth and industrialization in the early stages of China’s reforms. The 
productivity of the TVE sector and TVEs’ contribution to the national economy in the 
first stage of the Chinese economic reform is comparable to that of the small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Japan and South Korea in the postwar era (Xu 1995).  
 
Because of China’s vast size, local circumstances varied across its regions, as did the 
TVE model, which was an organizational response to both the macroeconomic 
environment and local conditions. The rise of TVEs is illustrated in the rich and colorful 
regional models of such enterprises. Notably, regions with strong TVE development often 
have a historical tradition of entrepreneurship and a strong social norm benefiting 
business activities. For example, the Wenzhou tradition of commerce originated centuries 
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ago; documentation can be traced back to at least the Song Dynasty (the 11th century). 
Many of Marco Polo’s narratives of wealthy China (the 12th century) were depictions of 
southern Jiangsu. Entrepreneurs in southern Jiangsu and the Pearl River Delta 
(Guangdong) region built the earliest private modern industrial centers in China in the 
19th century.2  
 
Another determining factor of TVE development is the role local government plays in 
providing protections, allocating resources, coordinating activities, and so on. As the de 
facto executive owners of the TVEs, local governments had a strong incentive to promote 
TVE development in their communities. But their method of involvement is not 
necessarily the same across regions, as the following three models demonstrate.  
 
The “Sunan” model refers to the governance mode of TVEs located in southern Jiangsu 
province, including the cities of Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou, with a population of 14 
million. The most distinctive feature of the Sunan model is the leading role of community 
government. With the geographic advantage of proximity to Shanghai, which housed a 
significant number of SOEs, many TVEs were initially established in southern Jiangsu to 
work on subcontract orders from SOEs in Shanghai. They hired managers and engineers 
from the Shanghai SOEs, and their entrepreneurial officials moved aggressively in hiring 
skilled workers and copying technologies from the SOEs. They also adopted more 
flexible management and incentive structures than the SOEs had. By the 1980s, in 
southern Jiangsu, community governments developed the largest TVEs (without foreign 
direct investment, or FDI) in the nation.  
 
In general, TVEs in this region were characteristically large-scale collective processing 
industries. In the Sunan model, local/community government officials were the leading 
entrepreneurs. They set up the TVEs, took business risks, were in charge of the TVEs’ 
daily operations, helped obtain credit from state banks, secured land to build factories, 
won access to raw materials and built marketing channels, sometimes through their 
connections with SOEs.  
 
As a result of the rapid development of TVEs, more than half of family income in 
southern Jiangsu came from TVEs and on average at least one member of the local 
families worked in a TVE. The Sunan model witnessed the golden age of TVE 
development up to the mid-1990s. As tables 2 and 3 show, from 1980 to 1995 TVE 
employment in Jiangsu province (most TVEs in the province were located in southern 
                                                        
2 Interestingly, initial wealth, natural resources, and proximity to industrial centers are not prerequisites for 
TVE development. For instance, Taizhou and Wenzhou were both poor and remote mountainous regions in 
Zhejiang province but now are among the richest regions in China due to the development of 
entrepreneurial firms. 
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Jiangsu) increased by three-quarters and TVEs’ share of GDP enlarged from less than 
one-third to 60%. In fact, the Sunan model is much more general than it is restricted to 
southern Jiangsu. Indeed, it is often applied in a more general way to all the TVE 
developments in which community government plays an essential role in firm decisions, 
such as those in northern Zhejiang province and those in coastal Shandong province. 
 
The “Guangdong” model refers to the features of TVE development in the Pearl River 
Delta area. Similar to that in southern Jiangsu, there was also a prereform TVE 
development in this area with deep direct involvement of community governments. After 
Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and other cities were developed as special economic zones in 
the early 1980s, TVEs in this area successfully attracted massive investments from 
overseas diasporas, in particular from Hong Kong and Taiwan, as shown in Table 2, 
benefiting from their geographical proximity. Thus, the Guangdong model is 
characterized by a dominant community government presence together with heavy FDI 
involvement, which also brought in technology, management know-how, and marketing 
channels in the international market.  
 
The development of TVEs was so overwhelmingly important in local economies in the 
southern Guangdong area that many local governments transformed themselves into de 
facto headquarters of TVE conglomerates. The so-called “local corporatism” embodies 
this feature (Oi 1999). Indeed, local corporatism is a general phenomenon applicable to 
all TVE developments where community government played dominant roles, as in the 
Sunan and Guangdong models.  
 
Unlike the Sunan and Guangdong models, the Wenzhou model does not have any 
geographic advantage in access to SOEs and FDI. The city of Wenzhou, with a 
population of 7.8 million, is located in the mountainous region in southern Zhejiang 
province. It was remote from big cities and from any major production or trading centers, 
had poor transportation systems, and used to be one of the poorest regions in China with 
limited arable land. With a much less developed state and collective sector and a more 
isolated environment, and under the prereform political/legal condition that private 
business was not fully legal, Wenzhou was forced to make more institutional innovations 
in promoting private ownership and cluster-based production organizations than other 
regions.  
 
In contrast with the Sunan and Guangdong models, in which local government officials 
are the key entrepreneurs who take risks and initiatives, the Wenzhou model is a reaction 
of local government to spontaneous private business development. In Wenzhou, most 
businesses are driven by private entrepreneurs. The critical role of local government is to 
provide a favorable business environment, particularly protection. Just as with the other 
two TVE models, development of the Wenzhou model mirrored TVE development in 
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many other areas. Indeed, TVE development in Wenzhou’s southern neighboring area of 
Taizhou in Zhejiang province is just as impressive as that in Wenzhou. With a total 
population of more than 13 million (30% larger than Hungary), Wenzhou and Taizhou 
together have developed the most dynamic private sector in China and have experienced 
one of the fastest prolonged growth rates among all Chinese regions.  
 
Although development of private business is the central feature of the Wenzhou model, 
the constitution of China did not protect private property rights until 2004. Thus, private 
entrepreneurs in Wenzhou faced questions about how to circumvent ownership risk. This 
was not only a problem the entrepreneurs needed resolved but was also a great challenge 
facing the local governments. To avoid direct conflicts with the legal system and with 
political resistance, many private enterprises resorted to cover-up practices such as 
attaching themselves to state agents. Local governments in the Wenzhou area, from 
municipal governments to township governments, not only gave a green light to these 
practices but also sometimes facilitated them. Some private firms became affiliated with 
SOEs by paying to use their name, stationery, receipts, account numbers, and so forth. 
Some other private firms chose to register as collectives with neighborhood or village 
committees (Tsai 2002; Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008). In essence, these “TVEs” were 
disguised private firms. With the “red hat,” the enterprises not only managed to legalize 
their private enterprises but also gained access to formal financing. Ironically, it was 
under this kind of “unconstitutional,” “red hat” protection from local governments that 
private business in Wenzhou boomed. Therefore, the Wenzhou model is substantially 
different from the other two models.  
 
The rapid growth of disguised private firms in Wenzhou caught the attention of the 
central government. In 1985, top national leaders visited Wenzhou and nodded to the 
practice of private firms’ wearing a “red hat.” In 1987, the State Council officially 
approved Wenzhou as one of the national rural pilot reforms with a focus on TVE 
institutional building (Zhu 2007). The so-called pilot reform was centered on developing 
regulatory remedies to allow private business to develop in the absence of constitutional 
protection of private property rights. In August 1987, an experimental regulation titled 
Interim Administrative Provisions for Registered Operations was officially issued in 
Wenzhou. Here, “registered operations” refers to a remedy operation that gives private 
businesses legal identity and legal status. This regulation protected and encouraged 
private business when constitutional protection was absent. Under the regulation, private 
businesses were allowed and encouraged to be affiliated with collectively owned or state-
owned enterprises by name, which made private businesses legal and simultaneously 
independent. Moreover, the regulation helped private businesses by opening up multiple 
channels, including helping them obtain bank loans, procure raw materials and other 
inputs, and sell their products, as well as other advantages.  
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The Wenzhou government initiated another major reform policy, which was aimed at 
protecting private business by forming so-called “joint-stock cooperative enterprises.” 
The highlighted word here is “cooperative,” which made the company a legitimate 
“socialist enterprise” under the legal framework at that time. Indeed, most of the 
shareholders of these companies were employees of the same firm at the same time. They 
were peasants who had just left the land to engage in nonagriculture activities and were 
directly engaged in the firm’s activities. The protection this policy provided was critically 
important for private businesses to survive and to grow through joint stock and other 
means of fund-raising.  
 
In summary, TVEs were dynamic production organizations that adapted to the weak legal 
environment and local comparative advantages early in China’s transition from a planned 
to a market economy. There are some regional variants in TVE development because of 
differences among local environments. The TVEs’ governance structures and 
evolutionary paths depended on many factors, such as inherited institutional 
arrangements, resource endowments, a location’s comparative advantage, entrepreneurial 
tradition, and others.  
 
2.3 Explanation of the Rise of TVEs 
 
The rapid growth of TVEs despite their vaguely defined property rights seems to defy the 
mainstream thinking of development economics (Weitzman and Xu 1994). From a 
viewpoint based on “standard wisdom,” the governance of these firms appears deficient 
and should be less productive than private firms with well-defined property rights. 
However, at the beginning of the period of reform, private ownership was still an 
ideological taboo, and therefore private firms were not a choice. Under that institutional 
constraint, TVEs were a more viable production organization choice than SOEs to meet 
changing market demand.  
 
A critical factor determining the growth of TVEs was Chinese regional decentralization. 
Indeed, as discussed already, from the very beginning TVE development itself was a 
direct outcome of regional decentralization. Fierce regional competition since the 
economic reforms gave subnational government officials, particularly county and 
township officials, a strong incentive to initiate or support the development of TVEs. It 
also created strong reasons for local governments to protect the properties of TVEs. 
Moreover, relatively self-contained subnational economies provided opportunities for 
TVEs to grow. Many subnational government officials, particularly community 
government officials, converted themselves into entrepreneurs. In many regions, local 
governments played profound roles as entrepreneurs in setting up TVEs, taking risks, 
making investments, and searching for business directions (e.g., Qian and Xu 1993; 
Chang and Wang 1994; Li 1996; Che and Qian 1998; Chen and Rozelle 1999). Overall, 
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although the de jure property rights of TVEs were not well defined at the national level, 
local governments provided de facto protections of property rights as a functional 
substitute for weak formal property rights. As a result, TVEs benefited from the implicit 
instrumental protections local governments offered (Zhang 2007).  
 
It is worth mentioning that similar mechanisms are at work today, after the decline of the 
TVEs, in assisting entrepreneurial firms regardless of ownership. That is, besides the 
importance of the development of the TVE sector itself, the mechanism that facilitated 
the TVE sector development provides institutional conditions for the rapid development 
of the private sector that replaced the TVEs.  
 
The booming TVE sector also benefited from the favorable macroeconomic situation at 
the time. After the success of rural reforms, farmers’ income experienced an 
unprecedented increase, as did the demand for many daily consumer products. The TVEs 
could produce a broad range of products. However, because SOEs were accustomed to 
privileged access to a variety of scarce materials and capital goods through quotas, they 
were irresponsive to changing market conditions. Without any favorable access to inputs, 
TVEs had to compete in the marketplace for survival. The dual pricing reform, which 
immediately followed the successful rural reform, allowed SOEs to sell unused input 
quotas at market price to the TVEs, which were outside the command economy. Such 
exchanges not only protected the original privileges of SOEs but also presented TVEs 
with a window of opportunity to access industrial inputs via market channels and expand 
their market share.  
 
Although decentralization was a nationwide policy, TVEs were developed better in some 
regions than others. Therefore, regional decentralization alone is not sufficient to explain 
the success of TVEs. As a matter of fact, most TVE employees and managers and a 
substantial number of township-village officials lived in the same community for 
generations, given that there was almost no migration before the early 1990s. Under 
certain conditions, close long-term interactions among community members (virtually 
infinitely repeated overlapping generational relationships) might foster a social norm 
within the community that may facilitate informal institutions such as TVEs. In contrast, 
SOEs are not organized based on natural communities, such as villages; many of the 
informal mechanisms prevailing in TVEs would not function in SOEs. Therefore, region-
specific local social norms, such as trust, may be an important factor behind the informal 
institutions of TVEs, such as implicit contractual relationships between community 
governments and TVEs and between TVE employees and between TVEs themselves 
(Weitzman and Xu 1994). This explanation shares the same spirit of the evolutionary 
repeated game theory of social norms (Axelrod 1984; Fudenberg and Maskin 2008). 
Empirically it sheds light on substantial regional differences in TVE development that 
reflect the history of diversified Chinese regional economic development. Once again, the 
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mechanism of social norms is not unique to TVE development. Indeed, regions with 
better “trust” and other pro-business social norms enjoyed better development in private 
business as well, as is discussed later in this paper. 
 
To summarize, TVEs emerged as adaptations to weak legal protections of property rights, 
expanding market opportunities, and a rich historical and cultural heritage. Their very 
successful development is not only the process of building up entrepreneurial firms but 
also the process of creating the conditions under which the private sector would thrive. 
Contrasting the Chinese TVE model with the painful lessons from most of the 
privatization programs implemented in countries in central and eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union suggests that privatization requires certain economic, legal, and 
political conditions. Private ownership cannot survive without legal protections. Private 
firms cannot be efficient if there is no product market, labor market, or capital market. 
Therefore, not only is TVE development not an unnecessary detour from a 
straightforward privatization program but it has helped to create political and economic 
conditions for private business. This argument is empirically supported by the fact that 
regions that now boast strong private business development often had strong TVE 
development in the past.  
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3. The Decline of TVEs and the Rise of Private Entrepreneur Firms 
 
The decline of the TVE sector is a happy ending. That is, it comes as a result of 
privatization and further development, rather than of shrinkage of the firms in the TVE 
sector. To some extent, the decline of the TVEs is a mirror image of the rise of the private 
firms. A common feature of different regional TVE models is that they were all 
embedded with a transitional feature when there were no proper political and economic 
conditions for private business. With the rapid development of both TVEs and private 
firms since the late 1980s, resistance against and fears over private ownership have 
gradually vanished. As political attitudes toward private ownership changed, various 
regulations and laws in favor of better protection of private property were introduced. By 
2004, private property ownership was formally recognized by the Chinese constitution. 
With such an improved institutional environment, TVEs lost ground in the marketplace 
through competition with private firms despite their previous ability to adapt to weakly 
protected property rights. Since the late 1990s, a large number of TVEs have been 
transformed into private firms (Xu 2008).  
 
The sharp decline of employment levels in the TVEs in all the three leading areas and in 
the nation in the late 1990s (Table 2) and the dramatic decrease of output growth rates of 
TVEs in the same period (Table 3) reflect the magnitude of privatization of TVEs. The 
change in Jiangsu province in the late 1990s is particularly impressive in that TVE 
employment declined by more than half and TVE output declined by about one-quarter. 
At the same time, private sector employment in Jiangsu province more than doubled and 
output increased by more than seven times, the fastest expansion in the nation. 
Interestingly, the Sunan model eventually followed the Wenzhou model in reforming firm 
governance structures.  
 
In hindsight, it seems natural that all three TVE models should converge to the model 
dominated by private or shareholding firms; however, at the beginning of the reform, the 
path of TVE growth was not clear at all. The presence of multiple models created a 
regional competition for local governments to identify and test the best firm structures for 
China’s unique economic and political situation. In the end, the Wenzhou model 
prevailed. The massive privatization of TVEs in the late 1990s largely followed the path 
of the Wenzhou model. To a large extent, the path of TVE development was a discovery 
process without a predetermined trend.  
 
3.1 The Rise of Entrepreneur Firms in Zhejiang Province 
 
In this section, we focus on entrepreneur firms in Zhejiang province for two reasons. First, 
the Wenzhou model discussed earlier originated in Zhejiang province, and that model’s 
success illustrates an important facet of the subsequent nationwide TVE privatization. 
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Second, as a direct outcome of the outstanding development of TVEs, Zhejiang has the 
largest indigenous private sector of all China’s provinces, accounting for more than 60% 
of the province’s output in 2000 (Table 3). Indeed, concerning TVE development in 
Zhejiang province, when reform had just started, employment in the province’s TVE 
sector was already 13% more than that of the state sector (Table 2). This is the highest in 
China. Moreover, two of the three major TVE models prevailed in Zhejiang. The 
Wenzhou model originated in southern Zhejiang, whereas the Sunan model applies to 
TVE development in northern Zhejiang.  
 
Thanks to the fast growth of TVEs and closely associated private business since the early 
1980s, Zhejiang province has become one of the richest provinces in China. With strong 
local government support, many Zhejiang private businesses expanded rapidly through 
enlarging scale and integration, and became large corporations or even multinationals, 
such as China Feiyue Group, which has branches in more than 40 countries and accounts 
for 50% of the world market share for sewing machines, and Geely Automobile, the first 
independent Chinese carmaker, which is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
 
At the same time, with local government–provided political and economic infrastructure, 
small entrepreneurial firms have grown extremely rapidly not only in numbers but also in 
efficiency. An important efficiency-enhancing trend is that small entrepreneurial firms 
have become increasingly specialized and clustered. These specialized small firms are 
linked together by networks of subcontracts where each final product is produced by a 
collection of many specialized firms. With concentrations of a vast number of small 
specialized firms, many townships in Zhejiang have become national or international 
centers of certain products. For example, Datang township makes one-third of the world’s 
socks; 40% of the world’s neckties are made in Shengzhou township; more than 70% of 
the buttons for clothes made in China come from Qiaotou township; Songxia township 
produces 350 million umbrellas every year (Hessler 2007); and Puyuan township outputs 
more than 500 million cashmere sweaters per year.3 
 
Next we present two in-depth case studies of private entrepreneur firms in Zhejiang 
province to illustrate the rise of such firms and their intimate connections with TVEs in 
the past and with local government today.  
 
3.1.1 A Case Study of Puyuan Entrepreneurial Firms4 
                                                        
3 In addition to the salient development of cluster formation in Zhejiang, national statistics indicate a 
general trend of clustering of small firms. In the period 1995–2004, the industrial location-concentration 
rate increased by 16%; the number of firms in the top three locations with the highest concentration relative 
to other areas rose by 41% from 3.28 to 4.64 (Long and Zhang 2008). 
4 This section draws heavily from Ruan and Zhang (2009). 
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Here we use the Puyuan cashmere production in Zhejiang province to illustrate the 
operation of entrepreneurial firms and the role of township governments. Puyuan 
township of Tongxiang county, Zhejiang province, is the largest production/trading center 
for cashmere sweaters in China with market transaction turnovers topping 10 billion yuan 
and a business volume amounting to nearly 500 million cashmere sweaters, which 
accounts for 60% of the national total. As of 2004, more than 3,900 workshops and more 
than 50,000 people were engaged in the production of cashmere sweaters, and there were 
more than 6,000 sweater-trading shops, in this township (Ruan and Zhang 2009). One can 
trace the entrepreneurial tradition in Puyuan back to the 12th century (Song Dynasty) 
when Pu silk (Pu-chou) was invented there and renowned nationwide. Textile industrial 
clustering is part of a tradition that has been prevalent in this area since the 15th century 
(Chen 1996). The operation of such textile clusters shares many features with today’s 
Puyuan clusters. 
 
The manufacturing of cashmere in Puyuan started in 1976 when a TVE (called a CBE at 
that time), the Puyuan Tanhua [Weaving] Production Cooperative, began producing 
cashmere sweaters. The gross output value of the cooperative soared from 28,000 yuan to 
300,000 yuan in just one year, prompting the group to devote all of its production 
capacity to cashmere sweaters by the end of 1977. This firm’s huge success prompted 
farmers in nearby villages and workers from the township- and village-owned enterprises 
to set up their own cashmere sweater production workshops.  
 
Meanwhile, market demand for clothes surged exponentially after the success of rural 
reform in the mid-1980s, and this ever-increasing demand greatly stimulated production. 
Facing severe credit constraints, most entrepreneurs initially worked at home using a few 
secondhand weaving machines and sold the sweaters along a main road linking Shanghai 
and Hangzhou. These small businesses faced the major problem of the lack of a trading 
place. In April 1988, the township government and the local administration for industry 
and commerce constructed a cashmere sweater marketplace by investing more than a half 
million yuan. The marketplace provided space and facilities for shops, storage, and 
workshops for cashmere merchants and producers. Both local merchants and those from 
other regions in the province quickly moved into it. The concentration of businesses in 
the marketplace greatly enhanced productivity by deepening the division of labor. In 
1990, the township produced more than 2.8 million sweaters, and approximately 90% of 
the households in Puyuan township and its peripheral villages were engaged in the 
production of cashmere sweaters. 
 
By 1992, the old marketplace had exceeded its capacity. Between 1992 and 1994, the 
local government raised another nearly 100 million yuan and built 11 more marketplaces 
for intermediate inputs and cashmere sweaters. Once again, the new marketplaces were 
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very popular and quickly filled with merchants from all around China. The establishment 
of standard markets for intermediate and final goods enabled small family workshops to 
easily access raw materials, intermediate inputs, and national markets. Easy market 
access also lowered transportation and marketing costs, which eased the severity of the 
credit constraint problem. As a result, the majority of entrepreneurs chose to specialize in 
only one stage of production—further deepening the division of labor. Cashmere sweater 
production recorded an explosive growth in this period. As of 1994, Puyuan’s sweater 
production capacity reached as many as 10 million pieces with market sales exceeding 2 
billion yuan, making it the largest cashmere sweater production center in China.  
 
By the late 1990s, the large expansion of low-end cashmere sweaters had largely driven 
prices down. The profit margin for enterprises producing high-quality, brand-name 
sweaters was much greater, but Puyuan had very few well-known local brands at that 
time. Thus in 2000, the local government set up an industrial park of 2,245 mu (1 
mu = 0.067 hectare) in an attempt to attract well-known cashmere sweater enterprises 
with famous brands from elsewhere in China. The industrial park also offers favorable 
policies, such as land, tax, and credit, to brand-name producers. In addition, the local 
government devised policies to encourage local enterprises with excellent growth 
potential to settle in the park, expand their production, and establish their brands. Most 
enterprises in the industrial park are large integrated factories with their own brands.  
 
The township government also took responsibility for maintaining quality by enacting 
two decrees on the quality of cashmere products. The county quality control bureau set up 
branch offices in the main marketplaces so as to better enforce quality regulations. 
Moreover, the provincial-level public notarization agents and inspection companies were 
invited to set up a quality inspection center in the town to provide quality certification. 
Furthermore, the government established a human resource development center to train 
employees of cashmere production firms. Given the high turnover rates for employees in 
clusters and the fact that most firms are very small, this public training program is 
essential for maintaining the quality and efficiency of the cluster.  
 
Started from small family businesses, two models evolved in Puyuan: partially integrated 
firms and completely nonintegrated clusters of small firms (the “putting-out system”) 
(see Figure 1). About one-ninth of all employees in the Puyuan cashmere industry worked 
in partially integrated firm as of 2007. Most of the partially integrated firms have their 
own brands or engage in OEM (original equipment manufacturer) production for other 
manufacturers. Most of them are located in the industrial park and own factory buildings. 
As shown in the lower part of Figure 1, they purchase yarn from the yarn dealers in the 
marketplace or from yarn factories directly and complete the weaving process in-house. 
In a typical case dyeing is not integrated into the firm. They outsource semifinished 
goods to specialized dyeing factories and finishing factories. After this process, the 
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products are then ironed, sorted, and packaged inside the factory before being ultimately 
shipped out to the national market through the logistics center. An integrated firm has an 
average of more than 2.6 million yuan of fixed assets, about 132 times a typical worker’s 
annual salary. In 2005, there were 121 such integrated firms and more than 20% of their 
starting capital came from banks. Based on these statistics, it appears that most 
entrepreneurs with limited capital cannot get involved in the integrated mode of sweater 
production.  
 
Most small firms or family workshops instead opt to operate in an alternative way within 
the cluster system, as the upper part of Figure 1 shows. Sweater merchants are leading 
entrepreneurs in coordinating production processes. These merchants either rent or own 
shops in the township’s designated sweater marketplaces. They often imitate the designs 
of big companies or emulate designs from fashion magazines, and they make sample 
sweaters. The sample sweaters displayed in their shops usually bear their own trademarks. 
As the largest cashmere sweater market in China, many merchants visit the shops in the 
trading areas of Puyuan.  
 
When receiving orders or after production decisions are made based on expectations of 
marketing, leading entrepreneurs purchase the raw materials and deliver them to the 
subcontracting weaving workshops down the production chain. Then, the semifinished 
goods are sent from weaving workshops to the subcontracting dyeing factories, which in 
turn pass the goods on to the finishing factories. Printing and ironing workshops receive 
these goods after the finishing stage. In the end, the products are packaged in the sweater 
merchants’ shops. The main reason the merchants package in their own shops, instead of 
leaving it to the subcontracting shops, is to inspect quality. If they spot any quality 
problems, they trace them back to the sources of production and resolve the issue with the 
responsible party. In this business model, raw materials and intermediate products are 
frequently transported from one processing point to another by a number of three-wheeler 
drivers. The most important players in the industrial cluster are the leading entrepreneurs, 
who coordinate yarn dealers, family weaving workshops, dyeing factories, finishing 
factories, printing workshops, ironing workshops, and three-wheeler drivers to engage all 
the production processes. After passing through this large-scale “assembly line,” the final 
products are transported to other markets through the Puyuan logistics center. 
 
Although small firms have many advantages, the lack of a scale economy is a major 
shortcoming. By forming clusters of small firms and providing centralized infrastructures, 
the local government handled this problem. Take the ironing process, which requires a 
large amount of fixed-cost investments, as an example. The local government has located 
all the ironing workshops in a designated zone of the industrial park, where natural gas is 
centrally supplied. With greatly reduced fixed costs, setting up small ironing workshops 
becomes viable. This in turn further deepens the division of labor, which results in a 
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further reduction in capital requirements.  
 
The capital requirement for specialized small firms engaged in the cluster mode of 
production is substantially lower than that of integrated firms. For example, the capital 
cost over labor cost ratios are between 0.25 and 6, whereas the average ratio for  
integrated firms is substantially higher than 100. This considerably lowered entry barriers, 
as the upper panel of Figure 1 illustrates. As a result, the small firms engaged in putting-
out production account for 72% of total employment (more than 72,000) in the sweater 
cluster.  
 
3.1.2 A Case Study of the Wenzhou Footwear Cluster5 
 
In terms of output quantity, Wenzhou is home to the largest footwear cluster in the world. 
In 2004, the cluster produced 835 million pairs of shoes. Since the 1970s, Wenzhou has 
developed a highly specialized and coordinated industrial cluster consisting of thousands 
of firms involved in various stages of shoemaking (see Figure 2). Over the last few 
decades, its market share has grown from small into the largest in China.  
Wenzhou has a long tradition of shoe-making. At the onset of the reform, almost all 
shoes in Wenzhou, about a half million pairs annually, were produced by two state-
owned factories and eight collectively owned factories (TVEs are collectively owned 
firms). These firms served as “seed factories,” training a large number of technical 
workers, marketing specialists, and managers, laying the groundwork for the emergence 
of the Wenzhou shoemaking industry in the subsequent reform era.  
 
Indeed, many private enterprises in the Wenzhou footwear industrial cluster can be traced 
back in history to one of the collectively owned enterprises. Figure 3 traces the origins of 
today’s major footwear firms. The 19 firms on the left are the original footwear firms of 
the late 1970s.6 The firms shown in the boxes in the middle and to the right are today’s 
best-known private footwear firms; their relationships with the original firms are depicted.  
 
As with the development of TVEs, one of the most important factors nurturing the 
extraordinary growth of the private ownership–based footwear cluster was local 
government support. However, this time the government support was indirect, via setting 
up numerous specialized markets. The following is a list of some better-known markets: 
the Wenzhou “Footwear Capital” Market, the Hetongqiao Footwear Accessories and 
Ornamental Materials Market, the South Zhejiang Footwear Accessories and Ornamental 
Materials Market, the Original Leather Market, and the Leather and Footwear Machine 
Market. 
 
                                                        
5 This section draws heavily from Huang, Zhang, and Zhu (2008). 
6 Due to space limitation, the figure lists only 12 firm names.  
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The specialized markets greatly fostered the development of specialized clusters in the 
footwear industry. Associated with this development, in Wenzhou a large number of 
highly specialized small firms operate in this industry. Apart from more than 4,000 
footwear factories and workshops, there were also 200 leather enterprises, 380 footwear 
sole enterprises, 200 footwear machine manufacturers, 168 footwear last factories, 100 
footwear accessories and ornamental materials enterprises, 50 footwear design studios, 
and numerous specialized footwear-related information service agents, training schools, 
research institutes, family workshops, and so on in 2004.  
 
Specialized clustering effectively decomposed the shoemaking process into many small 
steps, which lowers both technical and capital barriers to entry. Moreover, it mitigates 
problems that entrepreneurs face, such as high transaction costs in scattered markets and 
credit constraints. Thus, it enables a wide range of rural workers, who otherwise would 
be unable to participate under the traditional factory system, to become entrepreneurs. 
Concerning the technical barrier to entry, with a fine division of labor, the skill 
requirement for each individual working within the cluster was substantially lowered. 
Consequently, entrepreneurs without much skill in shoemaking could enter. According to 
a survey, more than half of footwear industry entrepreneurs did not have any experience 
in the industry at the time of starting their firms (Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008). With 
respect to the capital barrier to entry, by dividing the production process into specialized 
tasks and creating favorable conditions for using trading credits among workshops within 
a group, clustering greatly reduced fixed costs of production. The minimum investment in 
the Wenzhou footwear industrial cluster has been lower than a migrant worker’s annual 
salary. Therefore, clustering provides entrepreneurs with a platform on which to test out 
their luck. Through competition, the best survived and grew their firms into bigger ones.  
 
Another critical role that the local government has played in nurturing the Wenzhou 
footwear industry is quality control. Under severe price competition, some producers 
started to use lower-quality raw materials, even fake leathers, in shoe production. In the 
mid-1980s, Wenzhou shoes were ridiculed as “one-day shoes” for their poor quality. The 
quality crisis reached its climax in 1987 when a dozen Chinese cities boycotted or banned 
shoes made in Wenzhou. Facing the crisis, led by the Lucheng district government, the 
quality bureau and bureau of industrial and commercial administration of Wenzhou 
established a joint footwear quality control and management office in Lucheng, the core 
area of the footwear cluster. The office randomly sampled shoes from different 
producers. It issued quality certificates for those passing the quality check, and producers 
that failed the test were barred from selling their shoes to other places and posting any 
commercials. At the same time, the Lucheng District Footwear Industry Association in 
Wenzhou was established to work with the Wenzhou Quality Control Bureau for quality 
control. In addition, the government provided various preferential treatments, such as 
land and tax breaks, to those firms with brand names and reputations for high quality. It 
also rewarded each firm that won the title of “nationally known brand” with 1 million 
yuan. With these measures in place, the footwear industry jumped from a vicious cycle of 
racing to low quality to a virtuous cycle of racing to the top.  
 
3.2 The Boundary of the Firm: The Township Government versus Individual 
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Entrepreneurs  
 
The preceding examples represent typical industrial clusters that can be observed in many 
different industries located in numerous places in China, particularly in Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shandong. These representative cases pose an interesting 
challenge to the famous question Coase raised more than seven decades ago: “What is the 
boundary of the firm?” (Coase 1937). Indeed, if we put all of the employees and facilities 
of cashmere production in Puyuan together, we may think of Puyuan as a large 
production cluster of cashmere sweaters with more than 50,000 employees and occupying 
a 60% share in the Chinese cashmere sweater market. What is the boundary of the firm in 
the Puyuan production cluster?  
 
The modern firm theory and property rights theory (Williamson 1975; Grossman and 
Hart 1986; Hart 1995) spell out the costs and benefits of integration. In this theory a firm 
is a set of assets under common ownership. If many different assets have the same owner, 
then we have an integrated firm. If they have different owners, then there are many firms, 
and transactions between them are market transactions. Control rights over assets give the 
owner power to decide how the assets should be used when unforeseen contingencies 
occur.  
 
The nonoverlapping distribution of control rights and property rights poses challenges to 
this theory. Most of the workshops and trading shops in the Puyuan cluster are legally 
owned by families. Thus, instead of concentrated or integrated ownership, as in a typical 
corporation, the Puyuan cluster has distributed ownership with thousands of workshop 
owners and trading shop owners. The most important feature is that although owned 
separately these workshops are highly coordinated with each other. The typical 
transactions between upstream workshops and downstream workshops are not based on 
written contracts, and they are more similar to those within a large firm than those in 
markets.7  
 
The most challenging issue is the control rights of the cluster. To sharpen our analysis, in 
the following we call the collection of cashmere production clusters within Puyuan a 
“conglomerate” (or a virtual conglomerate) and call each small firm a workshop of the 
conglomerate. Let us focus on control rights of strategic issues of the conglomerate. It is 
interesting to note that except for most of the land and some of the buildings in the 
industrial park, the township government has no ownership of the assets of almost all the 
workshops within the conglomerate. Moreover, the township government is not involved 
                                                        
7 The literature documents some similar challenging phenomena, such as the subcontracting relationship 
between Japanese carmakers and part makers. For elaborated theoretical discussions on those, see 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1998). 
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in the financing of these workshops. Although unlike that of the typical headquarters of a 
conglomerate in ownership and financing, the township government takes strategic 
responsibilities for the overall development of the conglomerate. It coordinates strategic 
matters within the conglomerate; it regulates quality of all the products within the 
conglomerate; it guards the security of the assets and production of the conglomerate; and 
its entrepreneurship determines the overall direction of the business of the conglomerate. 
All of those things make the township government similar to that of a typical 
conglomerate headquarters.  
 
Nevertheless, the analogy between this virtual conglomerate and a typical large 
corporation stops here. The extraordinary development of this conglomerate is an 
outcome of thousands of individual entrepreneurs and officials of the township 
government with strong entrepreneurial spirit. The two types of entrepreneurs are 
complementary to each other in the rapid expansion and evolution of this conglomerate. 
It is obvious that without individual entrepreneurs the whole development would not exist. 
However, without the substantial roles of the township government, the production 
cluster would not evolve into the scale, efficiency, and quality of this virtual 
conglomerate either.  
 
Although the township government exercises substantial control rights over the strategic 
issues of the conglomerate, without asset ownership in the workshops, the conglomerate 
is not fully integrated. As a result, thousands of individual entrepreneurs make decisions 
bearing personal risks, and they have to coordinate with each other in daily operations. 
Why not convert this virtual conglomerate into a true conglomerate by integration? What 
are the costs and benefits of nonintegration?  
 
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of this conglomerate is that its ownership 
structure accommodates involvement of a large number of entrepreneurs, including 
official entrepreneurs and individual entrepreneurs, operating simultaneously. Compared 
with hired employees, entrepreneurs have stronger incentives to work hard, take risks, 
and take initiates to improve business. Thus, a conglomerate based on collective 
entrepreneurship may outcompete a fully integrated corporation in areas where constant 
entrepreneurial actions need to be taken. Two distinctive benefits are derived from the 
collective entrepreneurship: first, creativities, flexibilities, and adaptabilities come from 
the large number of entrepreneurs; second, built-in hard budget constraints do not exist in 
this structure for the individual firms in that the “headquarters” does not have any 
responsibility for risks taken by individual entrepreneurs.  
 
However, what about the costs of such a large subcontracting network without full 
integration? The key features of the Puyuan conglomerate are that it is neither fully 
integrated, due to its distributed ownership structure, nor does it participate in entirely 
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market transactions, due to the substantial non-price coordination mechanisms within the 
conglomerate. As discussed above, all the workshops within the conglomerate are highly 
specialized. Although a high degree of division of labor increases productivity, without 
full integration, one may worry about transaction costs among the specialized workshops. 
Surprisingly, it turns out that the transaction costs of nonintegration are well contained in 
this conglomerate due to its scale, culture, and structure.  
 
First, the township government set up infrastructures to allow all workshops to be 
concentrated in a few designated areas within a three-kilometer radius of the sweater 
marketplace. By keeping a large number of small workshops close to each other, the 
conglomerate reduces transportation costs and helps information transparency 
substantially. With the close distance and transparency of information, most workshops 
do not maintain physical stocks. Moreover, because local governments have provided 
many essential public goods and nearby markets have covered most intermediate inputs, 
a firm can maintain a small size by just focusing on one stage of production. A firm’s 
structure and size depend on its local environment, in particular the degree of generic 
public goods provided either by local governments or other firms.  
 
Second, this conglomerate is organized within a community, or as a community with 
intensively repeated business interactions. Within the community people know each other 
well and have a social norm of trust. Moreover, there are a large number of workshops 
that compete fiercely with each other within the community for each specialized task. 
Thus, the opportunity cost for anyone to break an agreement is high even when the 
agreement is unwritten. If a workshop cannot ensure its promised delivery schedule and 
product quality, it will lose both current and potential clients because word spreads 
quickly in the community. As a result, at equilibrium, almost all transactions between the 
upstream and downstream workshops are based on oral agreements, and when business 
disputes arise the court system has very rarely been used (based on field survey results).  
 
Third, based on the close and repeated relationship among workshops within the 
community, workshops issue trade credits to each other. Particularly, it is most common 
for the upstream workshops, which are usually larger and have better access to bank loans, 
to issue trade credits to downstream workshops. Widespread use of trade credits has 
greatly reduced the financing costs of a majority of workshops. This reduces the capital 
requirement, thus lowering entry barriers (Ruan and Zhang 2009). As a result, it 
facilitates the entry of a large number of potential entrepreneurs. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Township-village enterprises had a great impact on the rise of China. They served as a 
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major stepping-stone of institutional change when legal protections of private property 
rights were not in place. They also filled a market niche for daily goods as incomes rose 
rapidly along with economic reform, while SOEs were slow to respond.  
 
In essence, TVEs were an organizational response to constraints and opportunities in a 
location at a particular time. Because of significant regional differences in resource 
endowment and access to technology and capital, the path of TVE development is shown 
to be rather heterogeneous. The Sunan model capitalized on proximity to a large number 
of SOEs in Shanghai, while the Guangdong model relied heavily on FDI from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. With much more limited access to SOEs and FDI, the local 
governments and entrepreneurs in Wenzhou were forced to make more institutional 
innovations by introducing private ownership and cluster-based production organizations.  
 
TVE development has played a key role in nurturing entrepreneurship, fostering private 
business (indirectly), spreading management skills, accumulating physical and human 
capital, technology diffusion, and training skilled workers. In fact, many private 
entrepreneur firms were spun off directly from TVEs. Recognizing the influences TVEs 
have had on Chinese entrepreneurship is a key to understanding China’s economic 
development. The market’s role in nurturing entrepreneurship is well known in 
economics; however, the substantial role of local governments in cultivating 
entrepreneurship is much less studied and much less understood.  
 
An important efficiency-enhancing trend in the Chinese private sector is that small 
entrepreneurial firms have become increasingly specialized and clustered. These 
specialized small firms are linked together by networks of subcontracts so that every final 
product is produced by a collection of many specialized firms. Segmenting a production 
process into many phases that numerous highly specialized small firms carry out involves 
more transactions between firms and incurs higher transaction costs between firms. Yet 
extra benefits often exist within an industrial cluster that offset the additional transaction 
costs. Repeated interactions among the firms also help reduce the coordination cost of the 
greater number of transactions associated with the deepening division of labor in a cluster. 
Moreover, monitoring costs of integrated firms are avoided. 
 
The evolution of TVEs and the subsequent entrepreneurial firms illustrates that economic 
development is a continual process of overcoming limiting conditions. China, like many 
developing countries, had abundant labor but limited capital at the inception of its 
reforms. Moreover, it lacked a sound financial system and formal institutions that the 
standard development texts regard as preconditions for industrialization. The structures of 
such firms as TVEs and the subsequent clustering modes of production are organizational 
responses to these limiting factors. TVEs were created to overcome weak legal 
protections for property rights. After private property rights were recognized, TVEs 
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gradually lost ground to private firms.  
 
Even when private ownership is honored, a vast number of entrepreneurs still face credit 
and technical constraints, as well as institutional constraints, such as contract 
enforcement. Clustering offers one route through which poor regions like Wenzhou can 
overcome such constraints. With the availability of many specialized firms and joint 
public goods in a close neighborhood, firms can specialize in production at a small scale 
and many entrepreneurs can participate in the nonfarm production process. With massive 
concentrations of specialized small firms, many townships have become national or 
international production/trading centers of certain products. This successful industrial 
cluster development is an outcome of joint efforts of entrepreneurial local officials and 
entrepreneurial individuals. To a large extent, this is an extension of the institutions of the 
TVEs in an evolutionary path.  
 
From an evolutionary point of view, a firm is not an organization to be designed and 
implemented in vacuum. This is even more true when the political, legal, and economic 
conditions are all evolving from very unfavorable to better. The firm’s organizational 
structure is an outcome of interaction with other local and macro environments. As the 
environment changes, a firm’s organization and organizational structure may change as 
well. It is possible to create a vast number of small firms with distributed ownership by 
improving the supporting environment firms face, but it is hard to prescribe the optimal 
path of firm evolution beforehand. Competitive pressures are a way of eliminating less 
viable forms of organizational structures.  
 
Overall, both TVEs and clusters have provided an opportunity for many rural 
entrepreneurs to engage in nonfarm production. The success of China’s economic reform 
lies in the full use of individual talents, which are widely available among common 
people, and through introducing various institutional and organizational innovations to 
cope with limiting factors. 
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Table 1. Output Growth of CBEs (the predecessor of the TVEs), 1957–1979 
(in billion yuan at constant 1980) 
 
 
Sources: Chinese Agricultural Yearbook, 1986; Xu (1995). 
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Table 2. Employment by Ownership in Selected Years (in thousands) 
  Year Total SOE FDI Taiwan, HK, Marco TVEs Private Enterprises 
Jiangsu        
 1980        2,821.0            402.0          388.6   
 1985        3,263.0            468.8          627.1                             114.8 
 1990        4,225.0            536.9          672.9                             223.2 
 1995        4,385.2            576.2        18.0                              19.3        668.4                             256.3 
 2000        4,418.1            411.4        31.4                              20.0        295.5                             560.2 
Zhejiang        
 1980        1,856.4            208.5          234.9   
 1985        2,318.6            240.7          374.8                               90.6 
 1990        2,554.5            280.9          352.4                             143.1 
 1995        2,621.5            294.6        12.7                              12.4        382.4                             413.3 
 2000        2,726.1            208.2        13.9                              15.9        298.4                             582.0 
Guangdong       
 1980        2,367.8            563.6          204.9   
 1985        2,731.1            660.8          250.0                             152.0 
 1990        3,118.1            785.5          337.6                             320.7 
 1995        3,551.2            565.5        35.8                              94.1        569.5                             502.6 
 2000        3,989.3            425.5        43.0                            102.7        507.2                             421.1 
China        
 1980      42,361.0         8,019.0       3,000.0   
 1985      49,873.0         8,990.0       4,152.1                          2,826.9 
 1990      64,749.0       10,346.0       4,592.4                          4,672.3 
 1995      68,065.0       11,261.0      241.0                            272.0     6,060.3                          6,801.7 
  2000      72,085.0         8,101.9      332.0                            310.3     3,832.8                          8,986.8 
 
Sources: The total and SOE employment for the three provinces are from various issues of the 
corresponding provincial statistical yearbooks, while the same data at the national level is from 
China Statistical Yearbooks. The employment data for the enterprises owned by foreign, Hong 
Kong, Marco, and Taiwan come from various issues of China Statistical Yearbooks. The 
employment data for the TVEs and private enterprises are from China Township and Village 
Enterprise Statistical Materials, 1978–2002 (TVES/MOA 2003).  
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Table 3. GDP by Ownership in Selected Years (in billion yuan) 
    Total SOE TVEs Private Enterprises 
Jiangsu      
 1980            15.1               8.7               4.6                                  
 1985            30.8             12.7             12.9                                1.2  
 1990            63.4             21.8             27.9                                4.2  
 1995          246.8             53.0           147.4                              17.7  
 2000          384.9             84.1           112.8                            131.4  
Zhejiang      
 1980              7.4               4.2               2.0   
 1985            17.9               6.6               7.9                                1.5  
 1990            36.4             11.4             15.7                                6.0  
 1995          164.6             23.7             69.5                              75.0  
 2000          294.6             40.7           106.9                            177.1  
Guangdong     
 1980              9.0               5.3               1.6   
 1985            18.6             10.4               5.1                                2.0  
 1990            52.3             21.1             14.6                              10.3  
 1995          244.9             39.2             80.6                              26.3  
 2000          446.3           103.5           117.1                            101.7  
China      
 1980          199.7           151.7             28.5   
 1985          344.9           223.7             56.3                              21.0  
 1990          685.8           374.5           167.3                              83.1  
 1995       2,495.1           830.7           935.9                            523.6  
  2000       4,003.4        1,377.8           942.5                         1,773.1  
 
Sources: The GDP data for China as a whole for the whole period and SOEs for 1995 and 2000 
are from various issues of China Statistical Yearbooks. The GDP data for TVEs and private 
enterprises come from China Township and Village Enterprise Statistical Materials, 1978–2002 
(TVES/MOA 2003). Because the GDP data for SOEs were not available prior to 1995, we 
calculate them based on the ratio of total GDP to total gross industrial output value and the gross 
industrial output value of SOEs.  
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 Table 4. Number of Firms and Employment in Puyuan Cashmere Industry, 2005 
Type Firms Employment
Yarn dealers 250 535
Family weaving 
workshops 
3,518 42,074
Dyeing factories 23 1,150
Finishing factories 42 3,073
Printing workshops 100 500
Ironing workshops 100 318
Sweater shops  5,750 12,133
Transport 
(independent 
drivers) 
2,000 2,000
Integrated firms 121 8,254
Total 11,905 70,037
Sources: Puyuan Township Statistical Center, Administrative Committee of Puyuan Industrial 
Park, and Administrative Committee of Puyuan Marketplace.  
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Figure 1. Coordinated cluster of small firms versus integrated firms  
Note: The dashed-line chart in the figure represents the production processes of sweater shops. 
The solid arrows denote the actual flow route of the raw materials and semifinished goods, and 
the dashed arrows show information exchange among the entities.  
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Figure 2. The Wenzhou footwear cluster: Organized small firms 
Source: Adapted from Huang, Zhang, and Zhu (2008). 
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Figure 3. Origins of privately owned firms in Wenzhou 
Note: All the firms in the middle and to the right are privately owned. Source: Adapted from 
Huang, Zhang, and Zhu (2008).  
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